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The debate about global warming and the science supporting it is one of 
the most heated discussions in international public life. The debate has been 
heavily politicized. In the United States, for example, Al Gore, who served 
as vice-president during the Clinton administration, continues to be a major 
spokesperson for the reliability of climate science, whereas conservative 
leaders strongly argue that the theory of human-caused global warming is 
not sufficiently supported by evidence. In this debate, public intellectuals 
play a special role, as they are perceived by the public as having special 
cognitive authority and trustworthiness.
In this chapter, I critically examine the views of two leading Canadian 
public intellectuals, David Suzuki and Margaret Atwood, on the science of 
global warming. I argue that the social epistemic models of science to which 
they are implicitly committed face difficulties in sustaining the positions 
they advocate.
“Politicians Who Reject Science Are Not Fit to Lead”
In 2006, CBC viewers ranked David Suzuki (born 1936) as fifth among the 
“top ten greatest Canadians,” and, in 2011, he was voted “most trusted 
doi:10.15215/aupress/9781771990332.01
114  “Trust Me—I’m a Public Intellectual”
Canadian” by Reader’s Digest Canada for the third time in a row (Braganza 
2011). Suzuki, now professor emeritus of genetics at the University of 
British Columbia, has authored more than fifty books. In 1974, he started 
the popular CBC Radio science program Quirks & Quarks, which he hosted 
until 1979. Since then, he has been the host of the popular television show 
The Nature of Things, which is aired in more than forty nations, and he 
has been involved in numerous other radio and television programs as well.
In recent years, Suzuki has been actively involved in issues surrounding 
global warning. In 1990, he co-founded the David Suzuki Foundation, one 
of the major aims of which is to fight global warning, both through public 
education and by sponsoring initiatives relating to carbon print reduction. 
His activism has also made him a controversial figure. Many Internet sites 
are devoted to debunking his image and refuting his claims.
When one reads the numerous pages about global warming on the David 
Suzuki Foundation website, the message is clear: the scientific evidence for 
the occurrence of anthropogenic global warming is overwhelming; more or 
less complete scientific consensus exists on the subject; major catastrophes 
will occur in the near future if we do not act to prevent global warming; it 
is still possible to act, but the window of opportunity is closing; the public 
is vastly misinformed about global warming thanks to a few fringe scien-
tists, the media, various right-wing Internet sites that contain fringe science, 
conservative politicians, and industrialists; the public cannot distinguish 
reliable, that is, science-based, information from misinformation (Suzuki 
and Moola 2008; Suzuki and Moola 2011; David Suzuki Foundation n.d.).
Suzuki is very critical of climate skeptics, in particular politicians who 
refuse to accept the science and act on it, declaring that politicians who 
reject science are not fit to lead (Suzuki and Moola 2011). He has even 
called on students to try to find legal ways to jail politicians who ignore 
science, alluding to Canadian prime minister Stephen Harper, whose gov-
ernment backed away from the previous government’s commitment to 
implementing the Kyoto protocol (Babbage 2008). He regards climate-
change skepticism in the United States as part of an organized attack on 
science, which includes Republican politicians and religiously motivated 
creationists. He worries that Canada is going down the same path, but he 
finds some comfort in the fact that 80 percent of Canadians believe the sci-
ence underlying the theory of climate change, as opposed to only 58 percent 
of Americans (Suzuki and Moola 2011).
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What are the reasons, according to Suzuki, to trust current climate-
change science? Suzuki stresses the existence of a wide agreement in the 
scientific community, which was been achieved by a process of peer review 
and critical dialogue among experts who abide by scientific method. Suzuki 
puts special emphasis on the fact that the scientific consensus is socially 
diverse and includes scientists from many countries:
The overwhelming majority of scientists who study climate change 
agree that human activity is responsible for changing the climate. The 
United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is 
one of the largest bodies of international scientists ever assembled to 
study a scientific issue, involving more than 2,500 scientists from more 
than 130 countries. The IPCC has concluded that most of the warming 
observed during the past 50 years is attributable to human activities. 
Its findings have been publicly endorsed by the national academies of 
science of all G-8 nations, as well as those of China, India and Brazil. 
(David Suzuki Foundation n.d.)
While he acknowledges that science is not perfect, Suzuki believes that 
it is the best and most reliable means to gain knowledge of nature. He 
also regards consensus as the aim of scientific inquiry and views the social-
epistemic process that results in a consensus as the best means for achieving 
knowledge:
Science provides the best information about the world around us. Of 
course, it isn’t a perfect system. Scientific conclusions are often tenta-
tive, and can only become more solid after more debate, more research, 
and more observation. The process can take years. And scientists, being 
human, also have their own biases and points of view that can influ-
ence the way they ask questions and interpret data. But in the arena of 
open scientific debate, over time, consensus can generally be achieved 
regarding the best possible understanding of an issue. Scientific 
consensus does not mean we will always get the right answer. But if I 
were to bet on an issue, I’d put my money on scientific consensus over 
an observer’s hunch, a politician’s opinion, or a business leader’s tip. 
(Suzuki and Moola 2008)
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What is the epistemic rationale underpinning Suzuki’s view that such a 
process of consensus-forming critical deliberation in fact produces reliable 
knowledge? We can find an answer to this question in Helen Longino’s 
critical contextual empiricism. Longino (1990, chap. 4; 2002, chap. 6) 
argues that the process of inquiry and its product, knowledge, are inherently 
social, in the sense of being inherently dependent on critical interaction 
between people. Longino regards objectivity as the ultimate aim of inquiry. 
She distinguishes between two meanings of objectivity—the veridical rep-
resentation of reality and the lack of a subjective bias—and argues that the 
latter is required to achieve the former. Bias enters inquiry by filling the 
logical gap between theory and evidence. In cases where a theory is under-
determined by the existing evidence, inquirers make background assump-
tions that are neither logically necessary nor determined by the evidence 
and that typically reflect their biases and prejudice. Social norms of critical 
deliberation are therefore required to expose and eliminate such biases and 
thereby reach objectivity. Such norms grip on the individual inquirer in the 
sense that they require her to question and publicly defend her assumptions 
and claims to knowledge.
According to critical contextual empiricism, to count as knowledge, a 
consensus must be reached through a process of critical deliberation and 
scrutiny governed by four norms:
1. There are public venues of criticism, such as professional 
journals and conferences.
2. There is uptake of criticism: members of the community 
respond appropriately to the criticism and revise their views 
accordingly.
3. There are publicly recognized standards for the evaluation of 
theories.
4. There is tempered equality of intellectual authority: 
intellectual capacity and relevant expertise are the only 
criteria by which people are given the right to participate 
in the collective discussion, and all those who possess the 
needed intellectual capacity and relevant expertise can in fact 
realize their right to participate, regardless of gender, race, 
and so on.
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The consensus-formation process used by the IPCC may be seen an 
attempt to implement the norms of critical contextual empiricism. In fact, 
the guiding principles of the IPCC process are similar to Longino’s proposed 
norms. The IPCC also stresses the transparency of the process and the fact 
that scientists from both developed and developing nations are adequately 
represented in it:
Three principles governing the review should be borne in mind. First, 
the best possible scientific and technical advice should be included so 
that the IPCC Reports represent the latest scientific, technical and socio-
economic findings and are as comprehensive as possible. Secondly, 
a wide circulation process, ensuring representation of independent 
experts (i.e., experts not involved in the preparation of that particular 
chapter) from developing and developed countries and countries with 
economies in transition should aim to involve as many experts as pos-
sible in the IPCC process. Thirdly, the review process should be object-
ive, open and transparent. (IPCC 2008, §4.2.4)
It follows, then, that criticism of the norms of critical contextual empiri-
cism may apply to the IPCC epistemic principles as well. Indeed, such 
criticism exists. Critics argue that Longino’s four norms are either too 
permissive or too restrictive and are neither sufficient nor necessary for 
knowledge. Goldman (2002) argues that these norms leave too much room 
for interpretive flexibility. Interpreted too permissively, a community of 
like-minded people that adopts such norms, such as a group of creationists 
with their own peer-reviewed journals, may be said to satisfy Longino’s 
norms, although the agreement such a community reaches may not consti-
tute knowledge. Interpreted too restrictively, a community of scientists who 
refuse to engage with far-fetched criticism, such as evolutionary biologists 
who do not engage with creationists, may be said to fail to meet Longino’s 
norms.
Furthermore, these norms are neither necessary nor sufficient for know-
ledge. With respect to necessity, much of our current scientific knowledge 
has not been generated by critical scrutiny of this sort. Moreover, the stan-
dards of critical scrutiny that Longino requires may seem too high for ordin-
ary human beings to meet. To what extent can scientists who are immersed 
in a particular program of research both in terms of conviction and in terms 
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of their professional development, realistically be expected to engage in an 
impartial and equitable critical discussion while transcending their biases 
and prejudice? After all, a researcher must believe in her hypotheses in 
order to successfully defend them against criticism; and because scientists 
are rewarded for success, rather than effort, researchers’ personal and col-
lective success is strongly tied to the ultimate acceptance of their theories as 
the truth. This holds true especially in the climate science case, where scien-
tists are under immense political pressure to present a unified front, given 
that every disagreement or uncertainty will be used by politicians to raise 
skepticism and argue that immediate action is not yet required.
As for sufficiency, Solomon and Richardson (2005) argue that openness 
to criticism and social diversity do not alone guarantee the existence of 
actual relevant criticism, hence wrong or unwarranted views may survive 
for a long time even in a community that is in principle open to criticism. 
They argue that the conditions for knowledge cannot be formulated solely 
in terms of the procedures that a community should follow. These formula-
tions must also say something substantive about the conditions that the end 
product—the conclusions that the community reaches—must meet.
Another apparent difficulty with critical contextual empiricism is the 
problem of manufactured uncertainty. It seems that critical contextual 
empiricism faces difficulties in dealing with cases in which people seeking 
to prevent a certain view from being accepted cynically and deliberately 
insist on more and ever more critical scrutiny, no matter how strong the 
evidence in support of that view is. Because consensus is regarded as the 
aim of inquiry and a necessary condition for knowledge, bodies opposed 
to the existence of a particular piece of knowledge have a vested interest in 
inhibiting the formation of consensus or in creating the perception that a 
consensus does not exist. Indeed, Oreskes and Conway (2010) argue that 
the skeptical claims that global warming is not caused by human activity 
have not originated from within the scientific community but rather from 
politically motivated external actors who, consciously and cynically, have 
been manufacturing controversy on the subject.
Borgerson (2011, 445) argues that critical contextual empiricism can 
overcome the problem of manufactured uncertainty if we distinguish the 
level of certainty required for taking action from the level of certainty 
required for claiming knowledge. If these two issues are separated, inter-
ested parties will be less motivated to manufacture uncertainty. While I 
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agree that such a separation is desirable, it does not help critical contextual 
empiricism, qua a theory of knowledge, to deal with the problem of manu-
factured uncertainty. Regardless of Borgerson's suggestion, critical context-
ual empiricism should be able to provide epistemic criteria for discerning 
between legitimate criticism and manufactured uncertainty, when it exists. 
Critical contextual empiricism should also be able to provide principles for 
defining the conditions under which closure in an epistemic community is 
warranted despite incessant criticism. It remains unclear how critical con-
textual empiricism can address these challenges.
By highlighting the importance of consensus, Suzuki may very well 
play into some of the skeptics’ hands. Rather than discussing the evidence 
for global warming and the dangers that humanity faces as a result of it, 
the public debate centers on the question of whether a scientific consensus 
exists, when in fact there are good reasons to think that such a consensus 
is neither required for knowledge on the subject nor for the decision to 
take preventive action. That is, consensus is not a necessary condition for 
knowledge, and we do not need to wait to achieve the level of certainty that 
is required for legitimately claiming the possession of knowledge before we 
take preventive measures. Even a level of certainty that falls short of know-
ledge should suffice to prompt serious preventive actions against global 
warming, especially when the potential consequences of failing to do so 
are grave.
Suzuki also conveys a distorted image of science to the public, one that 
ignores the complex messy reality of research. Real scientific research is 
full of uncertainty, as well as academic politics and intrigue. In science, as 
in other human domains, power and authority are occasionally used to 
block certain views, but this should not licence sweeping skepticism and 
mistrust of science (Castel and Sismondo 2003). Encouraging public trust 
in scientific inquiry on the basis of a false idealized model of science as a 
disinterested enterprise of truth seeking is a hazardous tactic. Only under 
such circumstances can affairs such as the so-called Climate Gate occur 
(Ryghaug and Skjølsvold 2010). When, in the eyes of the public, scientists 
appear to fall short of meeting these unrealistic norms, climate skeptics 
have an effective weapon in their hands.
Finally, emphasizing consensus may actually inhibit scientific research 
and the growth of knowledge. Scientific pluralism and dissenting views are 
essential for successful inquiry. As Mill has famously argued (1993, 83–123), 
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the existence of dissent is necessary for correcting our views when they are 
wrong and justifying them when they are right. But a public demand for a 
unified scientific front as a necessary condition for action may lead to the 
undesirable consequence of silencing dissenting voices within the scientific 
community (Beatty 2006).1
In sum, David Suzuki’s argument for trusting current climate science 
puts too much weight on the existence of scientific consensus and relies on 
a noble, idealized model of science that, because unrealistic, is ultimately 
fragile and thus prone to backfire. Skeptics can all too easily subvert public 
trust in science by poking holes in this idealized model, thereby reinfor-
cing their own claims. Suzuki’s line of reasoning diverts public attention to 
less significant questions, such as whether a scientific consensus exists, and 
unnecessarily ties the climate-science debates to other politically charged 
debates, such as the evolutionism-creationism debate. Most importantly, his 
arguments sidestep the significant issues, namely, the actual quality of the 
scientific evidence and the risks that the international and global commun-
ity should be willing to take even in the face of a degree—some would say 
a normal degree—of scientific uncertainty and less-than-perfect evidence.
“We Are Fine. There’s Half a Tube of Food Left”
Margaret Atwood (born 1939) is among Canada’s most prominent public 
intellectuals. A novelist, poet, literary critic, and essayist, she is considered 
one of the first distinctively Canadian authors, whose writing is both about 
Canada and for Canadians. Atwood is widely known around the world not 
only as an author but also as a feminist and environmentalist activist. Her 
writing and activism are closely intertwined.
Atwood is ambivalent about science. On the one hand, she values it. She 
comes from a family of scientists. Her father was an eminent zoologist who 
conducted field research in the backwoods of northern Québec, where she 
grew up, and her brother is a senior neurophysiologist. She is a passionate 
birdwatcher and the honorary president of the Rare Bird Club (Bird Studies 
Canada 2006). In her childhood, she was drawn to science, and she regards 
science and literature as two fields of human creativity:
Human creativity is not confined to just a few areas of life. The techno-
scientific world has some of the most creative people you’ll ever meet. 
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When I was growing up, I never saw a division. For instance, my 
brother and I both have the same marks in English and in the sciences. 
My brother could have gone in the writing direction. And I could have 
been a scientist. (Quoted in McCrum 2010)
Some of Atwood’s novels, such as Cat’s Eye (1989), feature scientists as 
main characters and are informed by ideas from physics, which function as 
metaphors for understanding women’s experiences (Deery 1997).
On the other hand, Atwood is suspicious of science. Many of her novels 
and stories depict a dystopian or post-apocalyptic world in which people 
are confronted by the dreadful outcomes of current science and technology. 
For example, in Oryx and Crake (2003) and The Year of the Flood (2005), 
she tells the story of the survivors of an environmental catastrophe that led 
to the collapse of civilization. She describes the society prior to this collapse 
as segregated, dull, and violent, one in which animal abuse and child por-
nography are consumed as a form of entertainment and genetic engineering 
has produced bizarre animals and human beings.
Atwood dislikes the characterization of her novels as science fiction. 
She would rather characterize her work as “speculative fiction,” namely, 
“work that employs the means already to hand, such as DNA identifica-
tion and credit cards” and “can explore the consequences of new and pro-
posed technologies in graphic ways, by showing them as fully operational” 
(Atwood 2005). She deliberately avoids the word progress, preferring the 
word change, as she does not believe that science and technology necessar-
ily work to improve human life (Reach 2007).
Atwood also rejects the notion of objectivity as it is understood in main-
stream Western philosophy and science. She denies the possibility of a neu-
tral God-eye’s representation of reality. While she was originally drawn in 
her academic studies to philosophy in the analytic tradition, she turned to 
English, she says, because she found it less restrictive: “Logic says A cannot 
be A and non-A at the same time, but poetry says just the opposite” (quoted 
in Reach 2007). Her novels reflect this attitude as well. As Cuder (2003, 4) 
puts it: “In her writing, objectivity is always deceptive, a mere pretence. A 
façade that may hide more obscure interests. . . . For Atwood, perspective 
is all in the onlooker’s eyes, and perceptions are necessarily subjective and 
partial. No two accounts will ever be exactly the same, and therefore no 
one can make a rightful claim to History.” The perspectives that Atwood 
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represents in her novels are often those of women, often disempowered or 
abused, who are driven by the need to tell their stories to other women in 
an effort to make sense of their lives (Cuder 2003, 3).
Atwood’s rejection of one objective representation of reality and the 
alternative she puts forward—a collage of necessarily partial, subjective, 
and incompatible views, in which those of disempowered women are priv-
ileged—echoes with feminist standpoint epistemology, associated inter alia 
with the work of Sandra Harding. According to Harding (1995), every view 
is inherently and inseparably connected to a specific agent’s experience, 
identity, and position in society. There is no neutral point of view. Therefore, 
the presentation of certain scientific positions as neutral or objective is usu-
ally a political means to impose the views of the powerful on everybody 
else by claiming that these views simply represent things as they really are. 
If critical contextual empiricism requires social diversity in order to expose 
and eliminate the biases of specific agents and reach consensus, standpoint 
epistemology regards the attempt to detach a view from its subject as mis-
guided. Diversity is required to bring different perspectives to light, espe-
cially those typically excluded from discourse, but the goal is not to merge 
them into one.
Standpoint epistemology should not be mistaken with simplistic relativ-
ism. For Harding, not all positions and views are on a par. Since views are 
tied to identity and experience, the views of agents whose experience and 
identity are relevant to the topic deserve more attention. For example, in 
society in which women are the primary caretakers, their views about child 
rearing deserve more consideration. Because for Harding, the epistemic 
and the political are inherently intertwined, marginalized standpoints that 
have a potential for liberating the oppressed should be privileged. Reflective 
views of the marginalized and oppressed about their own experience deserve 
special consideration and carry more weight than knowledge produced by 
the oppressors about the oppressed. Harding’s and Atwood’s ideas clearly 
resonate with each other.
Standpoint epistemology is controversial. The main criticism is that 
Harding’s arguments rest on extreme and ultimately indefensible interpreta-
tions of Kuhn’s ideas about scientific knowledge as historically situated and 
of Quine’s thesis regarding the underdetermination of theory by evidence 
and are not sufficiently backed up by empirical data from the practice of 
science (Pinnick 2003). A detailed discussion of this criticism would exceed 
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the scope of this chapter, but, in the present context, two considerations 
require mention. First, the model of science that standpoint epistemology 
advocates is not the one adopted by the IPCC. The IPCC has chosen to issue 
unified consensus statements that represent the collective view of the com-
munity of climate scientists. It has not chosen to bring forward a diverse 
array of perspectives, among which certain tensions between standpoints, 
including potential dissent, may exist, to privilege those of the disem-
powered. It is therefore difficult to justify the epistemic model of the IPCC 
reports on the basis of standpoint epistemology.2
Second, standpoint epistemology, which emphasizes the locality and 
partiality of perspectives, faces difficulties when it comes to offering epi-
stemic support for causal claims of a global nature, such as the claim that 
greenhouse gas emissions cause an increase in atmospheric temperature. 
My point is not that it is impossible to find epistemic support for such 
claims on the basis of standpoint epistemology: I mean only that it is less 
suited to this task than other theories of knowledge and justification. How, 
then, are Atwood’s writing and activism on climate change to be reconciled 
with her apparent allegiance to standpoint epistemology? To answer this 
question, let us look more closely at her statements on this issue.
Atwood has been very vocal in Canada and internationally about the 
need to take action to prevent the catastrophic consequences of global 
warming. For example, in 2007, she issued a message of support of the 
Green Party of Canada:
Global warming—with the related environmental degradation, “nat-
ural” catastrophes, and accelerating species extinction—is surely the 
biggest issue facing, not just Canada, but the entire planet. Without 
oxygen to breathe, water to drink, and soil to grow food in, a cut to the 
GST is worth nothing. It won’t matter if you’re paying 1% less GST if 
you’re dead. Nor will your survivors care much that they got a deal on 
your coffin—they’ll be dead, too. Yet Stephen Harper’s government has 
gone from outright denial of climate change to lukewarm attempts to 
cover up and paper over this issue, while all the time keeping Stephen 
Harper’s pledge to “build a firewall around Alberta.” Stephen Harper 
doesn’t want us to develop alternate energy, he wants us to keep burn-
ing oil. That’s why there was no significant money for green economic 
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development in his latest budget. The Green Party can be depended on 
to keep green issues front and centre. (Atwood 2007)
Atwood (2010) has contributed a short story to an edited collection of 
short stories on global warming, in an attempt to trigger an emotional 
response by readers that will motivate them to act. In interviews, she 
repeatedly refers to global warming as the most pressing problem facing 
humanity, one on which its survival depends. She also notes that her apoca-
lyptic novels are inspired by the predicted global warming catastrophe.
Yet, as far as I can tell, in her public statements on global warming, 
Atwood, unlike Suzuki, has made no mention of the scientific consensus 
about it, and she rarely mentions the scientific evidence for it. This is not 
surprising, given that the theory of knowledge and justification to which 
she apparently subscribes does not recommend consensus formation as a 
reliable epistemic means. On the contrary, it regards such a process as detri-
mental to the aim of gaining knowledge because it eliminates the different 
standpoints from which different people argue, which are inherently part of 
the views they express.
Atwood’s claims regarding global warming rest on a different line of 
reasoning. For her, global warming is a consequence of human overpopula-
tion and overconsumption. Human beings, she argues, have been depleting 
all of the planet’s life-sustaining resources, to a point that the planet cannot 
continue to sustain human life. To illustrate this point, she gives the follow-
ing example, which is representative of her position:
There’s this test tube, and it’s full of amoeba food. You put one amoeba 
in at 12 noon. The amoeba divides in two every minute. At 12 midnight 
the test tube is full of amoebas—and there’s no food left. Question: 
at what moment in time is the tube half full? Answer: one minute to 
midnight. That’s where we are apparently. That’s when all the amoebas 
are saying: “We are fine. There’s half a tube of food left.” If you don’t 
believe me, look at the proposed heat maps for 20, 30, 50 years from 
now, and see what’s drying up. Quite a lot, actually, especially in the 
equatorial regions and the Middle East, which will be like a raisin. 
It’s become a race against time and we are not doing well. (Quoted in 
McCrum 2010)
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Atwood frames the scientific heat predictions within a neo-Malthusian 
apocalyptic vision of the death of humanity, not unlike her apocalyptic 
novels. She presents this apocalyptic vision as a fact of nature, with which 
it is impossible to argue. As she puts it: “Physics and chemistry are things 
you just can’t negotiate with. These are the laws of the physical world” 
(quoted in McCrum 2010).
While Atwood and climate skeptics are in opposite camps with respect to 
accepting global warming, they have something in common. They both rely 
on theories that diverge, at least in emphasis, from the mainstream theor-
ies accepted by the climate science community. Atwood ties the dangers of 
global warming with an apocalyptic neo-Malthusian vision of humanity, 
while the IPCC refrains from connecting these two issues. Atwood’s idiosyn-
cratic advocacy may stem from her tacit subscription to standpoint epis-
temology, which does not approve of the methods and epistemic standards 
employed in current climate-change scientific research.
Conclusion
Public intellectuals are in an excellent position to shape the terms within 
which the public debate is conducted. Uncertainty is an inherent part of 
science, and science may not achieve certainty even when pressed by the 
public to do so. Certainty should therefore not be a condition for acting. 
Action may be required in the face of uncertainty and in light of theories 
that fall short of constituting irrefutable knowledge. When such knowledge 
is eventually gained, it may be too late to act on it, and the consequences 
may be too horrific to face.
Yet this is not the position that Margaret Atwood and David Suzuki are 
advocating. Although Atwood and Suzuki argue from two very different 
perspectives on science, they have something in common apart from plead-
ing for action to prevent global warming. They both argue that the theory 
of anthropogenic global warming is an undeniable scientific fact, which the 
public and its leaders should unconditionally accept, and they both make 
their claims from within social epistemic frameworks that are incapable 
of supporting the alleged certainty of their claims. Thus, neither of them is 
making optimal use of their role as public intellectuals.
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Notes
1 I develop this line of argument more fully elsewhere. See Miller (2013) for 
the relations between knowledge and consensus, and Miller (2014) for the 
role of consensus in informing public decision-making.
2 The IPCC reports can be brought more into line with standpoint 
epistemology by considering the inductive risks that different people 
from different regions of the globe are willing to tolerate. Douglas (2009) 
identifies two types of inductive risks: wrongly accepting a false hypothesis 
and wrongly rejecting one that is true. She notes that there is an inherent 
trade-off between these two: the more we expose ourselves to the first, 
the less we expose ourselves to the second, and vice versa. She argues that 
social values determine the inductive risks that we are willing to take in 
a given context, and different social contexts may legitimately call for 
different balances between these two types of errors. When we think that 
the consequences of accepting a theory are not severe, we may lower the 
evidential threshold level required for accepting it. When we think that 
the risk is high, we may raise it. Since people in different regions of the 
globe face different predicted dangers and catastrophes resulting from 
global warming, it may be argued that they may legitimately weigh their 
risks differently and may therefore adopt different evidential standards 
for the acceptance or rejection of a theory. In this respect, the IPCC reports 
may, at least in principle, acknowledge differential standards for different 
researchers based on their standpoints.
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